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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents options for incorporating a strong return-to-work focus in the 
disability eligibility requirements for the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) 
disability programs.  In developing options, we first review alternative disability concepts 
from other private and public disability programs that focus on an individual’s residual 
capacity to work, rather than an inability to work.  We then examine the potential 
implications of applying different components of these alternative conceptualizations to 
the current disability eligibility requirements.  Our analysis illustrates that policy makers 
must struggle with the real costs of creating a more expansive set of disability eligibility 
criteria that focus on work (which will significantly increase the size of the caseload), 
with the other costs of having an all-or-nothing disability definition. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several decades, there has been increasing momentum among the 
disability community and policymakers to create laws, policies, and programs that 
promote the integration and inclusion of persons with disabilities into the mainstream.  
One key factor in attaining these goals is the expansion of employment opportunities for 
persons with disabilities. Passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990 
was a landmark step toward this end.   
There has also been a push by policy makers to expand employment opportunities 
for Social Security Administration (SSA) disability participants in the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (DI) programs. The largest of these work-
focused efforts is the newly enacted Ticket to Work program, which is designed to 
promote work by providing SSI and DI recipients with a “ticket” to purchase 
rehabilitation from state VR agencies, as well as other providers that provide important 
employment and rehabilitation services.   
Despite the Ticket to Work and other related work incentive programs for SSA 
disability participants, there has been continued criticism of the degree to which the 
current disability system focuses on promoting return-to-work opportunities for its 
beneficiaries. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has suggested that current return-
to-work options for SSI and DI participants are limited in scope and should be 
significantly expanded (GAO 2002; Growick 2002).  Congressional hearings on the 
challenges and opportunities for SSI and DI programs included a number of witnesses 
expressing the hope that work could become a more central focus of the programs’ 
mission by drawing on the lessons from other public and private disability programs.  
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The purpose of this paper is to present options for incorporating a strong return-
to-work focus in the disability eligibility requirements for the SSA disability programs, 
which are the same for both the SSI and DI programs. We develop these options by 
examining alternative concepts used in other private and public disability programs.  
Using the general assumption that policy makers are interested in developing a more 
work-focused definition, we examine alternative disability concepts that focus on an 
individual’s residual capacity to work, rather than an inability to work.  These alternative 
concepts move away from a static concept of disability towards a more dynamic 
definition that allows for changes in disability over time and different environments.  
Our discussion draws on examples from a variety of private and public disability 
programs in the US and in Europe.  We include lessons from recent testimony before the 
Committee on Ways and Means on possible modifications to disability definition for SSA 
disability programs (Committee on Ways and Means 2002) and recommendations from 
other research reports on how to move towards a more work-focused definition.   
We take a broad view of what would necessarily be fairly sweeping changes to 
the disability eligibility requirements for SSA disability programs.1 Making return-to-
work central to these programs represents a major break in US disability policy and could 
require fundamentally transforming the focus of SSA disability (and potential retirement) 
                                                          
1This paper does not discuss recommendations for specific changes to the current disability determination 
process (e.g., updating the Medical Listings) for reasons other than increasing the return-to-work focus 
nature of the SSI and DI programs.   For example, several researchers and policy makers recently have 
proposed other modifications to the current disability definition to improve the efficiency and equity of 
processing applications at SSA offices.  For a review of specific directions in this area, see Wunderlich, 
Rice, and Amado (2002), Gerry (2002), and Robertson (2002). 
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programs, which have been primarily designed to provide cash benefits, as well as other 
disability cash transfer programs.  There is currently a tension between the disability 
definition for SSA disability programs and efforts to provide return-to-work services to 
participants in these programs because the eligibility criteria require successful applicants 
to prove an inability to work.  Contrary to arguing that not enough has been done to move 
toward a work-focused system within the current disability definition, we find that policy 
makers and SSA administrators are pursuing a number of interesting alternatives.  
Nonetheless, significantly more can be done if policy makers are willing to move away 
from the all-or-nothing benefit structure of the SSI and DI programs that focuses on a 
person’s inability to work, and consider more fundamental changes to the purpose of 
disability programs.  We also recognize and discuss that these changes come with serious 
implications.  
We first examine the current disability definition for SSA disability programs, 
including the history of developing this definition around return-to-work options.  Next, 
we discuss return-to-work conceptualizations for disability programs drawing on 
examples from other US and European public and private systems.  We then use this 
discussion as a framework for discussing possible changes to the current definition for 
SSA disability programs within the confines of other disability programs, as well as for 
possible changes that extend beyond these programs.  We conclude with a summary of 
our findings.  
SSA DISABILITY PROGRAMS 
The SSI and DI programs are the two primary federal cash benefit programs 
targeted towards people with disabilities.  SSA administers cash payments for both the 
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SSI and DI programs.  Broad changes to the SSI and/or DI programs, such as the 
enactment of Ticket, require legislative changes by policy makers, while SSA 
administrators have some authority to test demonstration projects and implement rule 
changes that are consistent with the broad goals for SSA programs put forth by policy 
makers.   
In general, SSI is a means tested transfer program targeted to low-income adults 
with disabilities who meet certain income and asset criteria, while the DI program is a 
social insurance program that is designed to replace the lost wages of adults with 
disabilities. To qualify for SSI, an applicant must meet a means and asset test.  To qualify 
for DI, applicants must meet certain work history and earnings conditions that vary based 
on age. Because DI benefits are based on past earnings, they are generally higher than 
SSI.  Unlike SSI, however, DI beneficiaries must wait five months before receiving 
benefits.  Additionally, SSI recipients are generally eligible for health benefits in most 
states under Medicaid, while DI beneficiaries are eligible for health coverage benefits 
through Medicare after a two-year waiting period. SSA automatically determines whether 
an individual is applying for DI, SSI, or both based at the point of application.  In many 
cases, individuals can qualify for benefits under both programs. 
Because of the similarity in goals and overlaps across the SSI and DI programs, 
policy makers have generally implemented the same types of return-to-work 
rehabilitation programs for both of these programs. The recent Ticket to Work legislation, 
which attempts to increase consumer choice and the availability of important 
rehabilitation services, is one such example.   
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A difficulty in developing return-to-work programs for disability participants in 
both programs is ensuring that these initiatives are consistent with the eligibility 
requirements for benefits.  Below, we provide a more detailed description of the current 
disability eligibility requirements for these programs and their implications for 
developing return-to-work policies. 
Disability Definitions 
As noted above, the SSI and DI programs use the same strict disability definition 
that requires that an individual:  
• Have a medically determined disability expected to last at least 12 months or 
result in death; and  
• Be unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” (SGA), which was defined as 
earnings above $780 in 2002 for all non-blind disability applicants.  The SGA 
limits for filing for a disability because of blindness was $1,300 in 2002. 
Because of these requirements, applicants must prove to program administrators a 
permanent inability to work.   
The disability assessment is based on a five step sequential process (Figure 1).  
To apply for benefits, a person must first file an application form at an SSA field office.  
The SSA field office then screens the applicant to determine the individual is engaged in 
SGA (Stage 1).  The SSA field office also verifies the income history of the applicant and 
makes a determination of whether the person is SSI and/or DI eligible based on the 
current level of assets (for SSI) and work history (for DI).   
Applicants who are financially eligible for SSI or DI have their applications sent 
to a state Disability Determination Services (DDS) agency, which reviews all of the 
necessary medical information to make a disability determination (stage 2 through 5).  
The DDS first assesses whether the applicant has a severe impairment that limits basic 
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work activities and whether that impairment will last at least 12 months or result in death 
(Stage 2).  The DDS then assesses whether an applicant has an impairment that meets or 
equals the Listing of Impairments, which is a set of codified criteria for more than 100 
impairment listings (Stage 3). Applicants who meet the criteria in stage 3 are awarded 
benefits. For those who do not meet these listings, the DDS makes an assessment of an 
individual’s residual functional capacity.  The DDS assesses whether an applicant’s 
impairment prevents participation in past work (Stage 4) and, if so, the DDS then 
assesses whether the impairment prevents any other work that exists in the national 
economy (Stage 5), while taking into account the applicant’s age, education, and work 
experience.  
An essential aspect of the disability determination process is that the initial 
application process generally averages three months because of the complexities 
associated in making disability assessments.  To make these complex assessments, the 
DDS collects information from several sources (e.g., physicians, psychologists).  For 
example, detailed physician records are necessary to determine whether an individual’s 
impairment meets or equals the listing (Stage 3).  Alternatively, the DDS might collect 
information from, say, an occupational therapist to determine whether an individual can 
perform any work in the national economy (Stage 5).  
The actual length of application, however, is even longer for many participants 
because most initial applicants do not meet the strict eligibility criteria and often appeal 
the initial determination decision. In recent years, just under 40 percent of initial 
applicants were awarded benefits at initial disability determination stage (Committee on 
Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives 2000). Many rejected 
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applicants appeal their initial decision using multi-layered appeals process, which can 
include a re-examination by other DDS officials not involved in the claim; a review by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ); and to the courts.  Approximately one-third of new 
awards were awarded on appeal in 1999.  For those who are initially rejected at 
application, the entire appeal process can last for several years.  
The complexity and length of the disability determination process likely has 
important implications for a program participant’s interest in returning to work.  During 
the application process, applicants spend several months providing potentially sensitive 
medical information that attempts to prove an inability to work. Once on benefits, 
recipients must continue to meet strict disability eligibility requirements (and other 
eligibility criteria) to maintain eligibility, which SSA periodically reassesses as part of its 
continuing disability reviews (CDRs). Those who do show medical improvement through 
a CDR could face the prospect of losing their benefits.  Consequently, throughout the 
application and benefit process, SSA disability participants must continually prove an 
inability to perform SGA or risk the loss of benefits. 
Not surprisingly, given the emphasis of disability determinations on the inability 
to work, the severe impairment characteristics of recipients, and the potential loss of cash 
benefits and health coverage, relatively few recipients leave the rolls each year because of 
recovery.  While there are some differences in the characteristics of SSA disability 
participants (e.g., DI beneficiaries are older, have a work history, are more likely to have 
a physical impairment), the anticipated duration of participants on both programs is very 
long.  For example, Rupp and Scott (1998) projected that SSI recipients between the ages 
of 18 to 34 would have an average expected duration of approximately 20 years.  
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Similarly, they found that DI beneficiaries are much more likely to age out of the 
program (i.e., turn 65) or die, than to leave the rolls because of work.  For many older 
workers, the probability of recovery is likely extremely low because of high mortality 
risks.  
A key issue in moving towards a more work-focused definition is recognizing the 
heterogeneity that exists within the population.  There are a wide range of impairment 
characteristics represented on both the SSI and DI programs, including those with severe 
mental and physical disabilities.  In 2001, 36 percent of SSI recipients and 22 percent of 
DI beneficiaries had a mental disorder listed as their primary impairment (SSA 2002).   
Previous findings suggest that the type and on-going need for services will vary 
significantly depending on a person’s impairment characteristics, as well as other 
characteristics (e.g., age) (Wittenburg et al. 2002).  For example, those with mental 
impairments might need more work support services, such as job assistance, whereas 
those with physical limitations might need more up front rehabilitation services and 
physical accommodations.  Understanding these different needs, particularly given the 
increasing surge of younger applicants with mental disorders, is an important issue facing 
policy makers interested in improving return to work opportunities.   
History of Return to Work Provisions 
The idea of providing return-to-work services among policy makers has been 
slow to evolve for SSA disability programs, in large part due to the disability definition 
used in the eligibility determination process. Policy makers have struggled with the basic 
notion of providing return-to-work services to a population that has already proven they 
cannot work during the application process.  Some have argued that it is fundamentally 
inconsistent to provide return-to-work services to a population that has proven an 
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inability to work.  On the other hand, others have argued that rehabilitation or work-
support services can play a vital role in helping to a person overcome a disabling 
condition.   
The debates over providing return-to-work services started with the establishment 
of the DI program in 1956 (SSI was not established until 1972).  Policy makers were split 
over whether to make DI simply a cash transfer program, or to create a link between DI 
and Vocational Rehabilitation (VR), thereby emphasizing the return-to-work nature of 
the program.  Consequently, they developed a compromise on the rehabilitation issue, 
and the DI program started with a cautious link to VR (Berkowitz 2003).  People were 
initially referred to VR, but those who refused services without good cause had their 
benefits suspended.  However, the usage of VR services was minimal in large part 
because most DI beneficiaries were over the age of 50. 
Throughout the history of the SSI and DI programs, however, there has been an 
on-going debate over whether to increase the availability the rehabilitation services to 
those participating in these programs.  Policy makers instituted various provisions that 
increased funding for VR services, though most initiatives generally targeted relatively 
small portions of the overall caseload enrolled in the SSI and DI programs.   
The debate over the provision of services to disability recipients has also been 
complicated by the different purposes of the SSA and VR agencies.  According to 
Berkowitz and Dean (1996), Social Security representatives have worked within a 
framework that generally viewed disability as a cause for early retirement.  In contrast, 
VR representatives have worked within a framework that generally viewed disability as a 
negative externality that could be remedied.  
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In recent years there has been a gradual movement towards increasing the 
availability of return-to-work services for disability recipients as evidenced by passage of 
the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act in 1999.  These changes are 
likely influenced by broader disability policy changes, such as the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), which seek to expand employment and social opportunities for 
people with disabilities.  Additionally, there is a desire by policy makers to stem the huge 
growth in both the SSI and DI programs, which both grew by over 50 percent in the last 
15 years (SSA 2002).  
Despite the increasing interest in providing return-to-work services to SSA 
disability participants, concern still exists about the efficiency of providing return-to-
work services to a population of disability recipients that has already proven an inability 
to work.  As noted by Berkowitz (2003), “more than 40 years of experience should 
determine whether it makes any sense to try to combine a program that pays cash based 
on individuals’ inability to work with one that attempt to return permanently disabled 
persons to work.  An examination of the experience thus far is not encouraging to those 
who advocate a marriage between the programs (pp. 16).” 
RETURN TO WORK CONCEPTUALIZATIONS IN DISABILITY PROGRAMS 
To move to a truly work-focused public disability program in the US requires 
changes to current conceptualization of disability for the SSI and DI programs.  Under 
current program rules, policy makers interested in improving the employment outcomes 
of SSA disability recipients face a difficult dilemma: How do you provide return-to-work 
services to a population using the current disability definition that only identifies those 
that have shown an inability to work? Changing this disability eligibility definition to be 
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more amenable to return-to-work is fundamental to making the programs more work-
focused.  
One source of potential options for change is the experiences of other public and 
private disability programs that provide cash benefits and services and have a greater 
focus on return-to-work.  In this section, we examine concepts used in a variety of public 
and private programs that combine cash benefits with some type of provision of return-
to-work options.  We discuss the disability assessment process, including concepts of 
temporary and permanent total or partial disability, and the mechanism used by these 
programs to provide return-to-work services, including early intervention, triaged 
services, and mandatory rehabilitation.  
Our discussion includes concepts from private US disability programs, Workers 
Compensation (WC), and four European public programs (England, Germany, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands).  We chose these programs as examples because each includes 
examples that are relevant to discussion of options in moving towards a more work 
focused definition for SSA disability programs in the next section. While the goals, 
context, and target populations of these other programs are far different from both the SSI 
and DI programs, the way in which they conceptualize disability and incorporate a return-
to-work focus can provide potential lessons for these programs.   
Disability Assessment 
Every disability program has an initial and on-going disability assessment 
process.  The initial assessment process plays a key role in the provision of return-to-
work services because it sends the first message that participants receive regarding their 
ability (or inability) to work.  This message is reinforced as participants continue to 
maintain their eligibility for program benefits during the reassessment process.   
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Initial Assessment  
The purpose of the initial assessment for SSA disability programs is to identify 
persons with the most severe disabilities for cash benefits. The rigidity of the definition 
creates an “all-or nothing” benefit structure (GAO 2001).  Applicants who satisfy these 
criteria receive long-term cash (and other) benefits, while rejected applicants do not 
receive any types of services.   
Other US and international disability programs use a less rigid structure in 
assessing eligibility for disability benefits.  These programs start with a much broader 
definition of disability status that either include multiple disability eligibility 
requirements (which range from less severe to more severe) or assume a temporary or 
episodic nature of disability.  
The initial assessment process in the WC programs generally focuses on returning 
a worker who was injured on a job back to work.  Unlike SSI and DI, WC only serves a 
population that experiences disability onset while working on the job and includes 
options for temporary benefits.  
Private disability programs, such as those from the UNUM corporation (one of 
the nation’s largest suppliers of private disability insurance benefits) cited in recent 
congressional testimonies, use an assessment process that both evaluates a person’s 
potential to work in various capacities and assists those with work potential to return to 
the labor force (Anfield 2002). The program definition includes three general layers to 
account for the different levels of severity among potential applicants, including 
difficulties working in (1) own occupation, (2) any occupation, and (3) gainful 
occupation.  The last layer of this definition, gainful occupation, is most similar to 
disability definition in SSA disability programs. Anfield (2002) notes that allowing for 
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more layers within the disability definition provides more protection for wage earners at 
all income levels and in a variety of work situations.   
While both WC and private disability insurance programs might require 
participants to apply for SSI and/or DI after a period, the eligibility requirements for 
these programs do not influence eligibility decisions by SSA. Rather, all SSA disability 
applicants must meet strict eligibility requirements to obtain benefits regardless of their 
activities or rehabilitation experiences in these other programs.   
In contrast, the four European countries that we reviewed tended to have a far 
more integrated set of programs that link temporary disability programs to a permanent 
disability program.  Each of these countries has a mandatory set of temporary sickness 
plans funded by employers that cover individuals regardless of whether disability onset 
takes place on the job.  These programs then feed into a set of temporary disability 
programs, which provide short-term benefits to individuals who meet certain criteria for 
temporary benefits.  After a waiting period for benefits, those who meet certain eligibility 
requirements might be eligible for permanent disability benefits, which are similar in 
nature to those from SSA.  In addition, European countries tend to have universal health 
coverage though public and private sources.  Unlike the US where individuals might risk 
losing their coverage if they move from a program (or lose a job), the availability of 
universal health care coverage allows for a far more integrated set of programs where 
individuals do not face the risk of losing important health care benefits.  
According to GAO (2002), the availability of short-term disability benefits in 
many of these countries is similar to the private insurers’ provision of benefits mentioned 
above in that they provide a transitional period for assessing an individual’s work 
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potential and providing treatment and rehabilitation. The availability of these benefits 
stands in contrast to SSA programs, where the application process forces applicants to 
wait several months before receiving any benefits and services.  As will be discussed in 
more detail below, the assessment for the permanent disability program in these countries 
is only made after an individual qualifies for temporary disability benefits. 
An important feature of the initial assessment process that influences the 
provision of return-to-work services is the definition of work limitation.  The SSA 
disability programs use SGA as a barometer for measuring work.   In contrast, other 
disability programs tend to focus on the worker’s ability to continue work in his/her 
current occupation.  These definitions are important because they are linked to return-to-
work program goals.   For example, return-to-work programs, such as the Ticket to Work 
program, provide payments for the placement of program participants in any job with 
earnings above SGA.  In contrast, private disability insurance and European disability 
programs tend to focus more narrowly on placing the program participant in his/her 
previous occupation, while WC programs typically provide return-to-work services 
targeted towards a previous job.  Because some occupations/jobs might require 
specialized services, the types of return-to-work services vary based on the program 
eligibility definition.  For example, in many cases, European disability and private 
disability programs provide specific on the job accommodations to help a person return to 
a previous job.   
Disability Reassessment 
The on-going return-to-work objectives of disability programs are generally 
reinforced by the program definition used in the disability reassessment process.  During 
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this process, participants must meet certain eligibility requirements to qualify for 
continuing benefits.   
SSI and DI participants undergo periodic CDRs using the same permanent 
disability definition from the initial assessment to establish on-going eligibility.  This 
definition reinforces the message that participants must have an inability to work to 
remain eligible.   
The disability reassessment process in other programs tends to recognize 
disability status as a “continuum.”  Specifically, in every program that we reviewed, the 
definitions changed from the initial and reassessment periods.  For example, in European 
countries, the eligibility rules change as a person moves from a temporary sickness 
program, to a temporary disability program, and finally to a permanent disability 
program.  Similarly, private disability insurers often move participants into different 
categories depending on their changing needs.  If a participant is benefiting from 
rehabilitation, s/he might be moved into a less “severe” or partial disability category.  
Conversely, if rehabilitation is not working, recipients are generally moved into the more 
severe or permanent disability categories.  
Permanent Disability Options 
Every disability program tends to have a permanent disability category designed 
to capture the population with the most severe disabilities.  A key difference from the SSI 
and DI programs, however, is that the assessment of permanent disability status in most 
programs generally does not occur until an individual has been a program participant for 
several months.  In some cases, such as in the German disability system, there are special 
categories of immediate permanent support, which are generally limited (e.g., life 
threatening impairment).  
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England’s Incapacity Benefits (IB) program provides permanent disability 
benefits that are most similar in nature to those in the SSI and DI programs.  After a 
waiting period of 28 weeks, a British recipient of temporary disability benefits can 
receive permanent Incapacity Benefits if s/he can show an inability to work.  Similar to 
SSA disability programs, the British assessment for permanent disability includes an all-
or-nothing benefit structure.  
An essential feature of most other disability programs is the availability of partial 
permanent disability benefits.  Partial benefits are generally calculated based on an 
impairment rating, as a replacement for lost earnings, or a combination of these two 
factors.  Partial benefits based on an impairment rating system are calculated based on the 
loss of functioning caused by a specific impairment.  For example, if heart condition 
forces a person to work part-time, a person might receive a 50 percent impairment rating.  
In this case, a person might receive 50 percent of a full disability benefit.  Conversely, 
partial benefits as a replacement for lost earnings are generally calculated as a ratio of 
pre-disability earnings to post-disability earnings.  For example, if a person’s earnings 
declined 25 percent following the onset of a disability, a system could calculate a benefit 
to offset the 25 percent decline in wages.   
In the US, WC and private disability programs both offer a series of partial 
benefit options to those who meet permanent disability criteria.2  In most cases, however, 
                                                          
2 Partial permanent disability benefits are also available in US Veteran’s disability programs.  The 
Veteran’s Administration uses a disability rating system to provide partial and permanent disability 
benefits to veterans who experience a service connected injury.  The disability ratings are based on a 
presumed reduction in earnings capacity caused by the disability.  Unlike WC and private programs, 
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participants who qualify for permanent disability benefits are required to apply for 
disability benefits from SSA. 
The European programs have an elaborate set of permanent disability options that 
combine full and partial permanent disability benefits (Aarts and DeJong 1996).  
Germany has a dual system with full benefits for those who lose two thirds or more of 
their earnings from any job in the economy and partial benefits for those who are more 
than 50 percent impaired with regard to their usual occupation.  Sweden uses a more 
expansive measure of permanent disability status (“inability to work in commensurate 
employment”) and three partial disability status categories that correspond to earnings 
loss (25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent, respectively).  Finally, the Netherlands 
distinguishes seven disability categories ranging from less than 15 percent disabled, all 
the way up to 80-100 percent disabled. The degree of disability is assessed based on the 
“worker’s residual capacity,” which is defined by the earnings flowing from any job 
commensurate with one’ residual capacities as a percent of pre-disability usual earnings.  
The existence of partial permanent disability options suggests that many systems 
recognize the potential for work even among program participants with permanent 
disabilities.  Rather than the all-or-nothing system, the partial benefit option assumes a 
continued attachment to the labor force even for those who might not be able to work 
full-time.  In fact, the attachment to the labor force is necessary to ensure that the 
participant maintains the income s/he had prior to disability onset, as well as other social 
benefits (e.g., increased self-esteem).   
                                                                                                                                                                             
however, the disability assessment for partial benefits is made during initial application for benefits (though 
these ratings can be appealed if a person’s condition worsens).   
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Provision of Return to Work Services 
The provision of return-to-work services is also influenced by a program’s 
disability conceptualization because these conceptualizations generally include 
assumptions about an individual’s ability to perform some type of work over an 
anticipated period.  In some cases, the eligibility requirements for program benefits are 
the same for all services, including return-to-work.  In other cases, programs modify their 
disability definitions to target a specific population for return-to-work services.   
A major factor in improving employment options for disability program 
participants is to ensure a speedy provision of return-to-work services.  Burkhauser, et al. 
(1999) found that the provision of accommodations immediately following disability 
onset among workers in the US increased the likelihood of return-to-work.  Similarly, the 
lessons from the private sector indicate that early intervention is a major factor in 
improving employment outcomes following disability onset.  According to Hunt et al. 
(1996), private sector insurance carriers have discovered that it is not a question of 
providing these services within one or two months of disability onset, but rather one of 
only a few days.   
The provision of early intervention services is a major issue given the long 
application process associated in making eligibility determinations for both the SSI and 
DI programs (which includes an additional five month waiting period).  As noted above, 
this wait time can last anywhere from several months to a couple of years, and applicants 
are unlikely to want to do anything that may jeopardize their eligibility for needed 
benefits.    
Policy makers have developed a “passive” recognition of the heterogeneity within 
the SSI and DI population.  Namely, in most return-to-work programs and 
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demonstrations for SSA disability participants, those who believe they are most likely to 
benefit from return-to-work services are the most likely to take-up these services and 
undertake the related risks to benefit loss.  We call this a passive recognition because 
there is not a government agency that attempts to actively determine the work capacity of 
different beneficiaries for participation.   
Not surprisingly, past efforts at providing return to work services to SSA 
disability recipients under this passive approach have been limited.  According to 
Berkowitz and Dean (1996) “the link between VR and DI continues to resemble a long 
funnel into which the DDS pour cases, to have only a few trickle out the other end.” (pp. 
240).  Similarly, many experts anticipate that the newly enacted Ticket program will also 
only affect a minority of the caseload because SSA disability participants do not receive a 
“ticket” until after qualifying for benefits (Rupp and Bell 2002; Growick and Drew 
2003). While the Ticket program is only in its earliest stages, less than one percent of the 
caseload has used their Tickets for rehabilitation services.   
Nonetheless, it is important to note that some of these efforts might still represent 
an important return to work services that is beneficial for recipients and the government.  
For example, even though most researchers anticipate that the Ticket to Work program 
will likely affect a small portion of the caseload, it is still possible that the program could 
represent a cost savings to the government, as well as improve the economic status of 
participants who use their tickets. 
Early Intervention 
In an effort to improve the timing of return-to-work services, SSA and researchers 
from the Disability Research Institute are developing pilot demonstrations that will 
provide early intervention services, including rehabilitation and temporary cash support, 
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to SSA disability applicants (Disability Research Institute 2002a).  The goal of these 
demonstrations is to test whether early intervention strategies can help keep some 
applicants in the workforce.  As part of the demonstration, applicants are required to go 
through a brief screening process that would identify DI beneficiaries with a reasonable 
probability (Disability Research Institute 2002b).  A second screening process would be 
carried out to determine who among the probable beneficiaries would be candidates for 
return-to-work services.3  Eligible applicants could take advantage of the return-to-work 
services or refuse the services and continue with the usual SSA applicant process.   
In essence, the early intervention demonstration project represents a modification 
to the current disability definition that creates a separate eligibility track to improve the 
provision of return-to-work services.  This demonstration project first expands the 
potential pool of eligibles by creating a more simplified application process to enhance 
the efficiency of processing applications.  Within that pool, the demonstration project is 
then identifying individuals who would most likely benefit from return-to-work services.  
These modifications are a departure from the all-or-nothing program definition.   
Triaged Rehabilitation Services 
Private disability programs provide an example of a mechanism for using a 
disability conceptualization to triage participants into pathways based on expected 
                                                          
3 Specifically, the DRI (2002a) developed an initial screening mechanism accounts for the applicant’s age, 
mental illness status, earnings status, number of functional limitations, and date of onset, which they 
assumed would identify DI participants with a 60 percent success rate.  The second screening mechanism 
for return-to-work potential accounted for the applicant’s age, education, work experience, motivation, 
disability type, medical stability, and family support.  Applicants who have a certain disability and return-
to-work score will receive return-to-work services.  
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duration and type of injury or illness. An advantage that private insurers have over public 
programs is that they are in contact with participants more quickly following disability 
onset.  According to Anfield (2002), unlike the approaches mentioned above, private 
disability insurers attempt to categorize persons based on different needs.  The process 
involves continual monitoring of the claimant through the disability duration to assess 
medical status and work capacity.  During this monitoring period, insurers might reassess 
a participants’ disability status depending on their progress in rehabilitation.  
Private insurers generally emphasize immediate intervention when possible in 
providing return-to-work services, with a specific focus on a participant’s ability to work, 
rather than inability to work.  In most cases, insurers maintain personal contact with 
participants on a regular basis starting immediately following disability onset.  
Individuals who need minimal accommodations generally receive immediate service.  In 
contrast, those who have a much lower probability of reentering the labor market receive 
on-going monitoring to determine whether return-to-work is possible.   
Mandatory Rehabilitation 
The strongest example of a link between return-to-work and a disability concept is 
likely the German system, which includes a mandatory rehabilitation period for most 
participants prior to permanent benefit receipt.  The rehabilitation intervention often 
begins when the health insurance agency urges a disabled worker receiving short-term 
benefits to apply for medical rehabilitation, which often happens while the worker is still 
in the hospital (GAO 2002). The social insurance office then evaluates the person’s 
capacity to work and, if necessary, refers the applicant to necessary services.  As long as 
the person continues to receive short-term disability benefits, the social insurance office 
monitors the case and periodically reassesses the person’s work capacity and need for 
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return-to-work assistance.  Long-term benefits are only awarded after it is determined 
that a person’s earning capacity cannot be restored through return-to-work interventions.  
As noted above, some participants with severe disabilities, especially life-threatening 
illnesses, are exempt from these services.   
Sweden also follows a similar pattern of mandatory rehabilitation before the 
provision of long-term benefits.  Social insurance offices closely monitor the use of short-
term benefits and intervene when employers disregard their early intervention 
responsibilities. The social insurance office then begins the process of determining 
whether the person will need vocational rehabilitation to return-to-work (GAO 2002). 
However, the focus of the Swedish system is on a short, intensive rehabilitation process. 
If a participant does not show an improvement through rehabilitation after the first year 
of benefits, s/he is referred to long-term benefits.  
The Netherlands system relies primarily on employers for providing return-to-
work services. Within three months of disability onset, employers must submit a 
preliminary plan (to the social insurance agency) to return the disabled worker to the 
workforce   (Aarts and DeJong 1996).  If the employer determines that the disabled 
worker cannot return to the workplace, or if the disabled worker has not returned to work 
after one year of receiving short-term benefits, the social insurance agency assesses the 
person’s condition to determine eligibility for long-term disability benefits. The 
assessment involves evaluations of the applicant’s physical and mental capabilities, 
which are then matched against different occupations to determine whether the person is 
capable of performing any work. 
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In the US, some state WC programs also attempted to implement mandatory 
rehabilitation programs for participants.  For example, the state of Washington 
implemented mandatory rehabilitation requirements in 1985, though these requirements 
were quickly repealed because it was seen as a major cost driver, particularly in cases 
where a participant had a very severe disability (Perrin, Thorau & Associates, 1998).  
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING A MORE WORK-FOCUSED DISABILITY 
DEFINITION  
Policy makers interested in incorporating more work-focused concepts into the 
disability eligibility requirements for the SSI and DI programs can use some of the 
examples from the previous section as a guide.  In some cases, alternative concepts could 
be incorporated directly into the current system. In other cases, policy makers might have 
to make fundamental changes to SSA disability programs, as well as other related 
disability programs, to introduced a more worked focused disability concept.  
Possible Modifications within Current Disability Definition  
Moving towards a more work-focused disability definition for the SSI and DI 
programs requires that policy makers examine alternatives to the current definition that 
focus on an applicant’s inability to work.  Requiring that applicants demonstrate their 
inability to work to qualify for benefits, as well as maintain on-going eligibility, conflicts 
with immediate return-to-work service efforts or requirements.  Below, we review 
options for potential definition modifications during stages of the application and 
allowance periods that might move the SSI and DI programs towards a more work-
focused set of disability criteria.   
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Pre-Allowance Options 
The creation of other alternative eligibility “tracks” at the point of application, 
which is similar to the early intervention approach mentioned above, could also move the 
SSI and DI programs closer to a work-focused definition if these tracks focused on a 
person’s ability to work.  This philosophy is generally consistent with the theory that 
providing services closer to disability onset improves the likelihood that a person with 
return-to-work.  As noted in the discussion of early intervention initiative above, these 
separate tracks represent a break from the current all-or-nothing benefit structure by 
creating multiple disability definitions. 
SSA Commissioner Jo Anne Barnhart recently announced the creation of several 
projects that would in essence create alternative eligibility tracks to provide work 
incentives and opportunities before people enrolled in SSI and/or DI.  Specifically, she 
announced plans for developing a temporary program that will provide immediate cash 
and medical benefits for a specified period (12-24 months) to applicants who are highly 
likely to benefit from aggressive medical care during a recent congressional testimony 
(Barnhart 2003).  She also announced that SSA is developing an Interim Medical 
Benefits demonstration project that will provide health insurance coverage to certain 
applicants throughout the disability determination process.   
Presumably, SSA administrators (and other policy makers) could create other 
(multiple) disability tracks similar to those mentioned above.  For example, SSA could 
create multiple tracks based on a person’s expected disability duration (e.g., six months, 
one year, more than one year) that would have shorter application wait times for shorter 
expected disability durations. These alternative tracks could provide more temporary 
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options that people with disabilities could use without the risk of permanently separating 
from the work force.   
While these tracks could significantly improve the provision of return-to-work 
services to applicants by cutting down the time they have to wait to receive services, they 
will also significantly expand the pool of eligibles applying for and receiving benefits.  In 
a time of increasing caseloads, it is important to recognize these potential tradeoffs 
(which we discuss in more detail below). 
Allowance Options 
Another option, which is similar to the pre-allowance option above, is to integrate 
multiple tracks into the current disability assessment process to provide a wider range of 
partial and full benefits.  As noted in Figure 1, DDS already makes assessments for 
function capacities for certain applicants who reach Stages 4 and 5 of the disability 
assessment process.  While the current process focuses on an all or nothing assessment, 
policy makers could modify the assessment process used by DDS agencies to allow for 
alternative partial permanent disability tracks.  For example, policy makers could modify 
the current disability assessment process in Steps 4 and 5 to quantify a person’s residual 
capacity in an attempt to provide partial benefits under SSI and/or DI.   
Unlike the pre-allowances options mentioned above that create separate tracks to 
essentially shorten the disability application process, this approach would seek to modify 
the disability definition by defining alternative eligibility groups using the same 
(presumably long) application process.  As above, this approach could significantly 
expand the pool of eligibles applying for and receiving benefits.  While this approach 
recognizes the heterogeneity within the population and offers more cash benefit options 
that currently available under the SSI and DI programs, its effect on expanding 
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employment opportunities for disability program participants would likely be limited 
unless policy makers and researchers develop a system to more quickly process disability 
applications (and, hence, bring it closer to the early intervention models described 
above).  
Post-Allowance Return-to-Work Options 
A final method of providing services through alternative conceptualization is to 
modify disability categories to target return to work services after a person has qualified 
for SSI or DI.  For example, policy makers could implement a triage approach where 
SSA and/or VR administrators attempt to target the most readily employable persons for 
rehabilitation services.  Policy makers could target individuals with certain age, 
education, and impairment characteristics for these services.  Alternatively, they could 
target services to impairment groups that might benefit from specific interventions, such 
as those with mental impairments (SSA is currently developing a demonstration to target 
this specific group).  A radical approach would be to require those in a specific 
subpopulation targeted for services to report to rehabilitation and/or employment services 
(similar to the German system).  An alternative, which is more consistent with previous 
outreach efforts in SSA disability programs, could be to provide additional financial 
incentives for voluntarily participating in rehabilitation activities and employment 
services.   
Unfortunately, these strategies are likely to have minimal effect on the broad 
population given that the initial assessment of SSA disability programs continues to focus 
on an inability to work.  Further, unless rehabilitation and employment services are 
mandatory for continued benefit receipt (which seems like an unlikely option), the 
passive nature of work programs will likely hinder participation.  Nonetheless, as noted 
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above, it is possible that some of these strategies could represent potential cost savings to 
the government, as well as improve the economic status of some portion of SSA 
disability participants.   
Possible Overhauls to the Current Definition 
If we make the assumption that the U.S. wants to move toward a more work-
focused public disability system, we need to consider the possibility of broad changes in 
the current programs. Below, we consider the implications of implementing in the federal 
public disability system some of the work-focused disability concepts discussed above.  
We recognize that these changes are sweeping and would require many legislative and 
policy changes for which this country may not be ready. However, given the clamor for a 
more work-focused definition, if the public really wants to make such a movement, it is 
necessary to consider major changes to the definition.  
Acknowledging the Continuum of Disability 
A movement towards a more work-focused definition would likely have to 
recognize the heterogeneity of the population with disabilities.  As noted by Wunderlich, 
Rice, and Amado, (2002) “disability is a dynamic process that can fluctuate in breadth 
and severity across the life course and may or may not limit ability to work. Disability is 
not a static event because it is the adaptation of a medical condition in the environment in 
which one lives…The meaning assigned to the term (disability) depends on the uses to be 
made of the concepts” (p 1-3).  The current disability conceptualization for SSA 
disability programs, however, is a static concept that assumes permanent disability status.   
Many other public and private disability benefit systems recognize two key 
aspects of the heterogeneity within the population by employing multiple disability 
definitions that often change over time.  First, these definitions recognize that applicants 
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have different capacities for returning to work at the time of application.  Second, these 
definitions generally recognize that the need for rehabilitation and other support services 
may vary during initial and on-going assessments as a person’s disability status changes.  
In some cases, particularly for those with mental illness disorders, the disability might 
only be episodic, and hence, not contained to a single time frame or disability severity.  
While there will always be applicants for benefits who have little or no residual ability to 
work (the so-called permanent disability of many systems), the current disability 
requirements for the SSI and DI programs do not attempt to capture those who might 
have even a partial residual capacity to work because it employs an all-or-nothing benefit 
structure.   
Recognition of the continuum of return-to-work capacity as part of the definition 
of disability in the eligibility process allows for inclusion of the multiple concepts of 
disability severity, which might be time limited or episodic (particularly important for 
those with mental illness) (e.g., temporary benefits), or resulted in a limited (but not full) 
incapacity for work (e.g., partial benefits).  This continuum essentially extends some of 
the two track models being implemented by SSA (e.g., early intervention) by adding 
more layers for eligibility.  However, unlike the disability definition, the emphasis on the 
continuum for disability is generally more on a person’s residual capacity for working, 
rather than a complete inability to work.  For example, most programs delay the award of 
permanent benefits until an on-going assessment period, whereas SSA makes an award 
for permanent benefits during the initial assessment.    
The diversity of the programs discussed above suggests that policy makers could 
develop a number of alternative mechanisms for implementing a work-focused disability 
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concept.  In general, these concepts are centered around a phased in system of initial 
disability assessment, with more intensive return-to-work services up front, moving 
toward a permanent or partial-permanent system for those who are unable to return-to-
work.  The system could also include an on-going assessment process that also 
incorporates some of these features by allowing for some flexibility for participants to 
move into different states of disability status.   
An even more radical notion that policy makers could explore would focus on 
placing program participants in their previous occupations, rather than any job with SGA 
(as is the requirements under Ticket).  This requirement would change the nature of the 
disability assessment process, as well as the provision of return-to-work services to focus 
more specifically on the interaction between an impairment and a previous work 
environment.  The German and Swedish systems use these notions in their disability 
process, though they also have far more employer involvement in the assessment and 
return-to-work process than is available in the US.   
Emphasizing Rehabilitation and Work Supports 
Another mechanism that could make a disability definition more work-focused, 
which was suggested by Growick (2002), is to tie benefit application with the provision 
of rehabilitation and/or supportive services.  A stronger connection between these 
services and SSA disability programs represents a fundamental shift from the current 
disability definition because such a system must recognize that applicants who do receive 
these services do indeed have an ability to work.  Under this revised system, an applicant 
would be evaluated for disability eligibility and return-to-work simultaneously.  
Presumably, this mechanism would speed the provision of the return-to-work services to 
SSA disability participants, and make SSA (or some other agency) a more “active” 
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(rather than passive) provider of these services.  Unlike the early intervention model, 
participation in rehabilitation services for eligible participants would be mandatory.  A 
more extreme version of this model is the rehabilitation-first model in the German 
system, where participants are required to participate in rehabilitation activities before 
applying for permanent benefits.  
Integrating US Disability Programs 
A final consideration for movement to a more work-focused public disability 
program in the US is the connection with the current WC and private disability cash 
benefit systems, as well other systems (VR, Medicaid and Medicare).  While we have 
pointed to some aspects of these systems as options for the SSA disability programs, we 
have not discussed how they connect to the current SSA program.  The current DI 
program functions as a “last resort” in some sense, after the WC and private disability 
systems. These two systems, in many instances, serve as the initial phase described above 
that provides rehabilitation services (sometimes through VR) and temporary benefits, and 
actively tries to return the person to work, similar to the European programs.  If the 
person is unable to work, they can receive permanent benefits through these systems but 
also are often eligible to seek DI benefits (assuming enough insured work experience).   
A broader work-focused public system could be structured to address this 
limitation in coverage.  However, running “parallel” systems raises questions of 
substitution for those currently covered by WC or private disability.  Employers and state 
WC systems would have an incentive to substitute the federally funded public system’s 
services and benefits for the benefits they provide. An example of a similar substitution 
effect is found in the public funding of health insurance benefits, which can lead to a 
“crowding-out” of privately funded (employer-employee) health insurance.  Past history 
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in the universal health care debates suggests that the government does not want to 
substitute federal funds for benefits that would have been provided anyway in the 
absence of the federal program.  Estimating the extent of such a substitution is difficult, 
but needs to be considered.  
Another possibility is explicitly integrating a new federal system with the current 
work-focused benefit systems.  Options for integration range from regulations on what 
system pays in what circumstances to a federal mandate that employers pay into a system 
for disability benefits with all workers covered. The current state WC systems serve as an 
example for mandated coverage of work-related disability, either through requirements 
that employers buy private insurance or pay into state-funded programs or some mix.   
However, a major difficulty a publicly funded program that provides return-to-
work services faces is how to involve employers.  Returning to the same employer after 
disability is often the best solution for workers when they are able to do so with 
rehabilitation services. The worker has the specific job-skills for that employer and the 
employer has knowledge about the worker’s general abilities.  Under the current WC and 
private disability systems, many employers have discovered that they have an incentive 
in helping the employee return-to-work quickly. This limits the likelihood of paying 
permanent benefits to the employee and keeps the employer from losing any investment 
in training they have made in that employee.  Also, the employer has the specific 
knowledge of the job and circumstances that can help make return-to-work services more 
effective.  
Creating a public system that retains this employer participation by creating 
appropriate incentives is important for increasing the effectiveness of return-to-work 
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services.  Many European countries have partnerships between employers and the social 
insurance systems.  Within these partnerships, employers and social insurance agencies 
collaborate on interventions to facilitate the return to work.  In private disability 
programs, insurers use disability case management as a mechanism for working with 
participants and employers in ensuring a smoother return to work.  As an extreme 
example in Germany, employers have to fill quotas for hiring disability program 
participants.  These quotas ensure a strong link between public program return-to-work 
efforts and the private sector.   
Even if the WC, private disability, VR and SSA systems could be better 
integrated, potential holes in the safety net exist for many low-income adults who do not 
have access to temporary benefits (Wittenburg and Favreault forthcoming).  Many low-
income adults with disabilities do not have access to WC or private disability insurance 
because they are not employed or experienced disability onset outside of a job (e.g., 
childhood disability onset).  Consequently, SSI benefits likely represent the primary 
benefit option for many low-income adults.  By comparison, as noted above, the 
European systems tends to offer more short-term benefits, particularly for low-income 
adults and those injured away from the job, because each country has a universal program 
of means tested benefits (for low-income adults), a mandatory set of temporary sickness 
programs for employers (that covers work and non-work related injuries) and broad 
access to health care through combinations of both public and private programs (Aarts 
and DeJong 1996).   
To address this gap, a very different option from that discussed above is to replace 
WC and private disability programs with a set of programs funded completely by the 
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government to cover all adults.  Presumably, this comprehensive disability program could 
provide temporary, partial, and permanent benefits similar to those in European programs 
or in existing private disability and WC programs.  Within this program, social insurance 
agencies could decide on whether employers have a specific role in funding or supporting 
(e.g., quotas) these services.   
In any major system overhaul, important questions remain regarding the 
efficiency and equity of new programs.  For example, who should be eligible for 
services?  Who should pay for these services (government vs. employers)?  What services 
should be provided?  When should services be made available?  Where should the 
programs be implemented (i.e., should there be a national program or should states have a 
say in these programs similar to WC)?  
Whether any of the aforementioned options are political or financially feasible is 
up to debate.  However, they do illustrate the potential lengths that policy makers would 
have to use to expand disability coverage and options to the entire population.   
Costs and Benefits 
In general, the changes both within and outside of SSI and DI programs 
mentioned above suggest increasing the size of the eligible pool, devoting more resources 
to rehabilitation efforts, or both to move towards a more work-focused system, which 
would have significant cost implications in the short run.  Modifying the disability 
definition to allow for a more diverse set of options at the initial and on-going assessment 
period will increase the number of persons potentially eligible for services, relative to 
current SSA programs.  While somewhat dated, Aarts and DeJong (1996) found that 
spending on disability benefits (not including rehabilitation or other benefits) as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1991 was between two to six times 
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higher in four European countries (Germany, England, Sweden, and Netherlands), with 
the Netherlands spending the most on services.  As noted above, the Netherlands also 
generally had the most disability eligibility categories, though Aarts and DeJong note that 
part of the high spending in Netherlands was due to the accountability of program 
administrators.  
In addition to increasing the number of beneficiaries, there are costs to providing 
work services.  Even if SSA does not directly provide services, administering a work-
oriented program through contracts or vouchers (as under Ticket to Work) adds 
substantially to the current benefit program.  One example of added program costs is the 
movement of the public welfare system under the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) in the US from a purely cash benefit program to one that also provides 
work-related services.  United State’s Secretary of Health Of Human Services Tommy 
Thompson has noted that of moving from a cash benefit program to one that emphasizes 
work services requires greater up front resources.  Investing in helping people return-to-
work can require significant resources. Even if a work-focused disability system does not 
offer full income-support benefits to those receiving work services, the additional 
expenditures are likely to be substantial.  
The tradeoff of upfront costs, however, must be weighed the possible benefit of 
shorter durations in a more focused return-to-work system.  Inevitably, some people who 
receive essentially lifetime benefits under the current system would return-to-work in a 
program that focuses on work.  Presumably based on experience in other programs, some 
people would enter the system sooner, limiting the time they are away from work and 
increasing the likelihood of returning to employment.  Additionally, it is possible that 
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more of those who are entering the SSA disability programs now would return-to-work 
because the application process would not have the current strong emphasis on proving 
inability to work.  Applicants faced with initial assessments and follow-up services on 
what they can do in regards to returning to work might be more likely to do so than those 
who have had to spend large amounts of time and energy proving they cannot work.   
Other costs and benefits that are likely immeasurable must also be weighed into 
such decisions.  For example, such changes might also entail other societal benefits that 
come from a stronger attachment to the work force by a broader population, such as 
increased participant self-esteem and a stronger integration of people with disabilities 
into the mainstream.  However, if these programs grow too large, some might question 
the efficiency and equity of these programs.   
Research Findings 
Unfortunately, we do not have evidence on the extent of either costs or savings 
that any of the aforementioned changes would have for SSI or DI.  While evidence from 
the Ticket to Work program and its evaluation may provide more information on this 
topic, estimates of the entry-effects of an expanded definition and the lifetime savings of 
return-to-work services goes well beyond these measures. Evidence from other programs 
on the effects of specific provisions is also limited for the purposes of making changing 
to the current SSA system.  While some international and private disability studies have 
documented some successes in return-to-work strategies, these programs operate in very 
different social contexts and/or with very different target populations.  For example, it is 
difficult to compare the outcomes from European programs to those in the US because 
most of these countries have a universal health care program.  Finally, even attempting to 
estimate post-allowance interventions within SSA programs is difficult because research 
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on the extent to which rehabilitation services can return persons with disability to work in 
SSI or DI is limited (Berkowitz 2002).   
Although difficult, it is critical that efforts be made to make plausible estimates of 
these costs and savings for specific program structures, at least to provide some 
parameters for policy makers considering moving toward a work-focused system.  These 
alternatives should be tested using experimental designs that will inform policy makers 
on the advantages and limitations of alternative approaches.   
The best mechanisms for testing these mechanisms are within the context of SSA 
demonstration programs, similar to the early intervention efforts.  If policy makers are 
serious about creating a more work focused approach, they might also suggest that 
collaborations between SSA and other disability systems (VR, WC, and private 
disability) or employers in searching for mechanisms to hasten the delivery of return-to-
work services to a specific target population of people with disabilities.  
CONCLUSION 
Because the current definition of disability used to make SSI and DI eligibility 
determinations focuses on an applicant’s inability to work rather than on their capacity to 
work, it is generally at odds with a strong return-to-work focus.  Policy makers originally 
developed the disability concept to provide cash benefits to a “deserving” population of 
people with disabilities.  As perceptions of disability have changed over time, particularly 
since the passage of the ADA, an important question is whether the current disability 
definition needs to be modified or completely overhauled to keep up with more modern 
disability conceptualizations.   
 36
A major issue in moving towards a more work-focused definition is ensuring that 
services are available to those immediately following disability onset.  However, people 
might have to wait for years before receiving such services while receiving SSA 
disability benefits, thereby diminishing their impact.   
The disability concepts from other programs tend to employ a more dynamic 
definition that allows for changes in disability status over time and different 
environments.  Unlike the SSI and DI programs that assess permanent disability status at 
the time of application, other programs tend to use changing disability concepts during 
initial and on-going assessments for program eligibility.  In general, these other systems 
have a more continuous measure of disability that first focuses on an applicant’s residual 
capacity at initial assessment and then moves to different levels of severity after a 
participant has shown a continuing inability to work during on-going assessments.  
Consequently, the disability criteria used at initial assessment are often different from 
those used during on-going disability reassessments.  Another major difference is that 
while other systems have a permanent disability measure, they often employ different 
levels of this definition, including partial and full disability benefits, depending on a 
program participant’s impairment severity and/or inability to work.  Finally, the 
definition of work itself and the role of employers also provide insights on possible 
modifications to the disability definition for the SSI and DI programs, which focuses on 
substantial gainful activity (SGA), rather than employment in a specific occupation.   
Although we believe big changes are necessary to implement a major shift in 
program focus, there are possibilities for creating a more work-focused definition within 
the current system.  These changes include interventions that target potential participants 
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before applying for benefits (e.g., early interventions, temporary benefits), through the 
current application process (e.g., partial benefits), and after qualifying for benefits (e.g., 
impairment specific populations).  In fact, the SSA is currently developing multiple 
demonstrations that provide benefits during both the pre- and post-allowance periods.  
However, because the SSI and DI programs tend to be a last resort for many applicants, 
the provision of return-to-work services might not be enough to affect the majority of the 
caseload during the pre-allowance or post-allowance periods.   
The alternative is to break away from the current all-or-nothing benefit structure 
of the SSI and DI programs and move towards a continuum of disability that is similar to 
other programs.  Several options within this continuum will influence the size of the 
population effected, as well as the costs of providing services.   
The magnitude of such a change is potentially very significant in both costs and 
benefits.  The costs of an expanded eligible population and provision of rehabilitation and 
work support services are potentially very large to the Social Security trust fund, in the 
case of DI, and the general fund of tax revenues, in the case of SSI.  This change would 
also represent a shift in program focus for an agency (SSA) that has historically focused 
on only providing cash benefits.  Another major issue is addressing the role of private 
sector employers and how to integrate an expanded public system with existing WC and 
private disability programs are also complicated and critical questions.  However, putting 
these costs in context of potential benefits to society in the form of increased attachment 
to the labor market among people with disabilities is also quite significant.  
In general, policy makers must struggle with the real costs of creating a more 
expansive set of disability eligibility criteria that focus on work (which will significantly 
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increase the size of the caseload), with the other costs of having an all-or-nothing 
disability definition.  Unfortunately, we do not have enough available research to predict 
the size of the population who might become eligible under alternative disability 
conceptualizations or the costs and benefits from such a change. 
We realize that the political will required to make such sweeping program 
changes- both in terms of legislative changes needed and commitment of public 
resources- will be difficult.  However, if policy makers and the US public are truly 
serious about moving towards a work-focused public system that addresses people’s 
abilities to work, then these major system changes and implications need to be thoroughly 
considered.  Moving from our current set of disability programs towards a more work 
focused public disability system could fundamentally transform the way our society 
thinks about disability and work.  It is a very complex proposition requiring a lot of 
thought and study.   Unfortunately, there are no simple answers.   
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